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Abstract: The paper discusses the impact of performance based selection in secondary education 
on student incentives. The theoretical approach combines human capital theory with signaling 
theory. The consideration of signaling offers an explanation for observed performance of 
educational systems with a standard peer effect argument. More specifically it can be optimal to 
select students according to ability even if selective systems do not outperform comprehensive 
systems in tests. Selection achieves the same output with lower private costs for the students. The 
paper questions the strong focus on educational tests to measure the efficiency of selective 
systems as long as these tests provide no information about a student’s incentives and private 
costs. 
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Selection is a key management instrument in educational organizations. Theoretical models often 
imply that ability grouping (or tracking or selection) is efficient. Assumptions about peer effects 
are one reason for this result. Peers enhance the marginal productivity of a student and this benefit 
typically increases in the ability of the peers. If this peer effect and individual ability of a student 
are complementary inputs then high ability students should be matched with other higher ability 
students into specific learning groups. Yet robust empirical foundations for this sort of peer 
interaction and their implications are hard to come by. In particular selective systems do not 
outperform comprehensive ones in international comparison tests like the PISA-Study (e.g. 
Hanushek/Woessmann 2006). 
This apparent contradiction either implies that the standard assumptions about peer interaction are 
wrong or that a more specific theoretical explanation is required. Such an explanation should 
eliminate the contradictions between theory and empirical result. This paper focuses on the latter 
and provides three contributions towards the understanding of selection in educational systems. 
1. The paper takes signaling activities into account. Selection has an important impact on the 
value of education because the placement of a student into a specific school or class 
provides additional information for a less informed party about the ‘raw’ ability of a 
student. 
2. The consideration of signaling offers an explanation for observed performance of 
educational systems with a standard peer effect argument. More specifically it can be 
optimal to select students according to ability even if selective systems do not outperform 
comprehensive systems. Selection achieves the same output with lower private costs for 
the students. 
3. The paper questions the strong focus on educational tests to measure the efficiency of 
selective systems as long as these tests provide no information about a student’s incentives 
and private costs. 
Educational tests are certainly informative but the results show that they require a careful 
interpretation. Selection influences incentives which again have an impact on educational test scores. Ignoring these incentive effects can imply inaccurate estimations regarding the outcomes 
of selection as a policy instrument. This paper therefore provides a theoretical contribution to a 
largely empirical literature. I do not argue against evidence-based policy making. However, a 
purely data-driven evaluation can lead to misleading results if important aspects are beyond 
observation. 
The argument of the paper can be summarized as follows. The analysis focuses on student effort 
provision. Students invest effort into their education for two reasons. Firstly, effort augments their 
skills and more skills translate into higher salaries after education. Secondly, schooling is a signal 
about a student’s ‘raw’ or innate ability which is unobservable. Students with higher ability have, 
on average, better marks. Innate ability directly affects productivity after education. It helps 
acquiring job-specific human capital or provides general problem-solving skills. Hence, 
employers want to identify ability and adjust wage offers accordingly. School performance 
provides valuable information about a student’s ability. This signaling aspect induces students to 
provide even more effort. 
Educational policy shape effort provision. The incentives for a student differ between a selective 
and a comprehensive educational system. In most selective systems, primary education is 
comprehensive and secondary education is selective. Some schools enroll the high ability students 
the other schools teach students with lower abilities. If peer effects and signaling are important 
then students want to get to school with the high-ability students. Therefore, the students in a 
selective system work harder in primary education. These students will outperform students from 
comprehensive systems in standardized tests even if they study in otherwise identical primary 
schools.  
In secondary education the incentives turn around. Ceteris paribus, students in comprehensive 
systems will provide more effort. For them, the final performance in school is the only clearly 
observable ability signal. Students in a selective system will work less hard because selection 
already has provided some relevant information about their ability. This difference can explain 
why potential gains in peer group effects from selection are so difficult to observe and why 
selective systems do not produce higher test scores. Note however, that the variance in effort 
provision can be much larger among students in a selective system. The positive impact of good 
fellow students and the resulting increase in marginal productivity compensate reduction in 
incentives. In the lower track the rather poor peer effects increase the disparity in incentives.  Therefore, a differences-in-differences methodology like in Hanushek and Woessmann (2006) or 
a similar approach discussed in Pischke and Manning (2006) underestimate the impact of 
selection on educational performance. Section E is dedicated to this measurement problem. 
The discussion about optimal education policy has largely ignored incentives for students, 
although empirical studies show that incentives matter (De Fraja et al 2005, Kremer et al. 2004  
with students from Kenya, Angrist and Lavy 2003 with Israeli student data). De Fraja and 
Landeras (2006) provide an inspiring theoretical contribution to the research of incentives in 
education. They show that increasing teacher incentives via more competition among schools may 
backfire on student incentives in a similar way.  
Furthermore, few studies on education policy consider the well established literature about 
education as a signal in the labor market (starting with Spence 1973). Bedard (2001) shows how 
dropout decisions in American high school confirm signaling arguments but contradict standard 
human capital theory. Unlike Bedard (2001) this paper investigates incentives when schooling is 
compulsory and selection is based on performance. De Fraja and Landeras (2006), Brunello and 
Giannini (2005) and Lee (2007) provide further exceptions. Brunello and Giannini (2005) also 
show why neither perfect sorting nor comprehensive schooling provides a strictly dominant 
solution, although with an entirely different treatment of the signalling problem. For them 
(Brunello/Giannini, 2005, p. 190)  
  "[s]tratified systems trade the advantages of specialization and signalling against the 
disadvantages of producing skills with limited flexibility and versatility."  
In Brunello and Giannini (2005), the students cannot influence the admission result and the 
subsequent signal with more effort. "Their" students have technical and academic abilities and 
schools provide different types of education. In contrast to Brunello and Giannini (2005), this 
paper provides a policy instrument to manipulate the sorting process. I do not discuss when 
students should optimally be separated. This problem is analyzed in Brunello et al. (2004). Lee 
(2007) shows how national differences in the optimal timing of signals shape student behavior.  
Many contributions to the economics of education make assumptions about how students 
influence their fellow students. Some authors (e.g. Epple et al. 2003 ), suggest that students 
benefit from the ability of their fellow students. Hence, if the average student in a class is a rather 
able one, the learning conditions for each student in this class are rather good. Able students may provide more help or induce greater interest in academic problems. Other authors emphasize 
homogeneity. If ability varies considerably among students in a class it creates a negative learning 
environment (e.g. Dobbelsteen et al. (2002)). One motive behind this idea is the willingness to 
cooperate. Students are more likely to interact if they face the same problems. Lazear (2001) 
discusses possible negative externalities of student behavior. Students can interrupt education and 
distract fellow students. All these approaches imply that ceteris paribus the (self)selection of 
students in homogeneous groups -with respect to ability or the propensity to interrupt- is efficient. 
“Good” students provide more positive external effects. They also get higher benefit from these 
effects because of higher marginal productivity. 
Econometric problems restrict the identification peer effects. The problem in many empirical 
studies (e.g. Hoxby 2000, 2001, McEwan 2003 , Hanushek et al. 2003, Cullen et al. 2003, 
Ammermüller/Pischke 2006) is the identification of exogenous ability measures to get around the 
so called "reflection problem" (see Manski 1993). Then, the (self) selection of students into 
different peer groups restricts the identification of what would have happened to the same student 
in another group. (Quasi-)Experimental studies may bring more insight but they are still in short 
supply. Sacerdote (2001) provides evidence for peer effects in dorms at Dartmouth College, 
where assignment to the rooms is a random process. A learning experiment with Swiss students 
shows that good students benefit from other students but this benefit is independent of the ability 
of the learning partners (Eisenkopf 2007). If this result can be confirmed in further experiments, it 
contradicts the standard peer effect assumptions. Finally, other reasons exist why a sui generis 
positive peer group effect can produce negative external effects on the outcome from ability 
grouping, e.g. higher failure rates for high-ability students (see Meier 2004). 
To support the argument, section B introduces the analytic framework. Section C identifies the 
resulting first-best solution. In section D intertemporal effects are analyzed. The section shows 
that selection in secondary education does not entirely reduce signalling incentives but shifts them 
to primary education. Section E discusses the econometric implication of this finding with a 
particular reference to Hanushek and Woessmann (2006). Section F derives empirically testable 
hypotheses from the model. It concludes with a discussion of policy implications. 
 
 2 The model 
 
Suppose the existence of one region with two schools    , ka b   of equal size. Each school must 
enroll half of the students in the region. The mass of students in the region is normalized to one. 
Students are heterogeneous with respect to their ability  . The ability is distributed symmetrically 
around   according to the differentiable distribution function F(   ) ,  w i t h   () () Ff 
  . The ability 
of student i is known by the student, but not by the future employer of the student. Employers 
know the distribution of ability among the students. Students can invest in effort e to improve 
their educational qualification. The costs of effort follow the function C () e , with   	 0 Ce
 
  and 
	 0. Ce
 
  Only the student knows about his choice of the effort level. 
Policy makers can choose between a comprehensive and a selective educational system, i.e. 
between sorting and integrating students. Under a sorting (or tracking) policy, high ability 
students go to one school and low ability students to the other one. Otherwise, the ability 
distribution is identical in both schools. For the moment it is assumed that sorting is perfect. The 
choice between a selective and a comprehensive system has an impact on average ability  k    in a 
school (the peer effect). Thus the contributions to educational output are defined: effort, ability 
and the peer effect. 

















 . All cross derivatives are strictly positive.   
Unlike in De Fraja and Landeras (2006) the observation of the qualification is distorted, i.e. the 
marks do not accurately reflect the actual skills. 
Assumption 2 A student’s observed educational output or qualification is  
  Qq   (1) 
The random variable  is iid across students and follows the distribution G() with the density 
function g(). The expected value of  is zero and g() is positive for all . The distribution is 
single-peaked and symmetric around the expected value.  Imperfect observation makes education risky. However, the paper does not discuss the 
implications of risk aversion but the impact of this imperfection on risk neutral students. 
Therefore, students and employers are risk-neutral. After education, a student enters the labor 
market. 
Assumption 3 A student’s labor market output depends on his educational qualification (q) and 
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 is in a parameter range such that the optimal effort supply is always 
positive but not infinite.   
Since employers cannot observe the ability  they have to estimate  and subsequently the 
expected labor market output from the observable qualification. The term (;Q) denotes the 
density of an employer’s belief about the ability of an individual whose observed qualification is 
Q. Belief formation takes place after the qualifications have been published. In a competitive 
labor market initial wage offers for a student with observed qualification Q are equal to expected 
productivity B(Q). 
  () (, )( ; )( )
  wB Q    Q    Q g d d          (2) 
Note that the expected wage offer for distorted qualification signals is lower than the offer for 
accurate ones. Labor market output (,q) is concave in both arguments and the actual 
qualification q again is a concave function of . The random variable , which distorts observed 
qualification Q, is symmetrically distributed around its expected value. Due to the concavity of 
the labor market output the employer’s losses from q<Q are greater than the gains from q>Q. 
Hence the employer has to offer a lower wage than in the case of perfectly observable 
qualifications. Otherwise the losses of students with a high ability from relatively poor observable 
qualifications (Q<q) would be smaller than the gains of less able ones from relatively good 
observable qualifications (Q>q). 
If the employer can learn the actual ability some time after employment has started, any new 
wage offer reflects the actual output (,q). For simplicity reasons, such a possibility is not considered in the analysis. It is discussed in De Fraja and Landeras (2006) and has no qualitative 
impact on the results 
 
 
3 To sort or not to sort?  
 
The analysis starts with the comparison of the two extreme cases. In the comprehensive case (no 
sorting) students are randomly assigned to the two schools. In the (perfect) sorting case, the more 
able students go to one school, the less able to the other one. A perfect selection test does exist. I 
will discuss imperfect selection later in the paper. As in De Fraja and Landeras (2006), the 
analysis is restricted to a pure strategy equilibrium with the following characteristics. Student 
effort does not decrease in ability. The employer formulates beliefs about a student’s ability such 
that the resulting wage offers increase in observed performance.  
The analysis focuses on the effort provision of a student who is motivated by his prospective 
wage offer. This wage offer is affected by the school performance which influences productivity 
and the employers’ beliefs. School performance depends on the selection policy. Therefore I 
compare effort provision in a sorting and a comprehensive regime. 
 
3.1 No sorting 
 
The ability composition in both schools is identical, which is denoted by the superscript ns. The 
respective peer effect is given by 
ns
k   , such that  ˆ
ns ns
a b      . The objective of a student is to 
maximize the difference between the expected wage and his costs of effort by his choice of effort. 
The student correctly anticipates the wage formation of future employers and the effort supply of 
his fellow students. As stated above the social externality of his qualification is irrelevant to any 
student. The maximization problem is    max ( ) ( )
ns
e BQ Ce   (3) 
with 
  () ( , ) ( ; ) ( )
ns ns ns
  BQ    Q    Q g d d         
The transformation of the first order condition yields  
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 (4)   
The first summand shows the marginal increase in productivity, the second one the marginal 
change in the employers’ beliefs. Better educational results increase the employers’ expectation 
about the student’s ability. However, all fellow students provide additional effort as well and the 




In a selective schooling system, the students with above-average ability  ˆ ()    
  go to school a, 
the others go to school b. Assume for simplicity that a costless test is available to identify 
perfectly if a student is above or below this threshold. Of course, after sorting peer effects at 
schools a and b have the following property: 
s s
ab    
 . The superscript s indicates that the students 
have been selected. Employers know that the ability of a student at a school a cannot be below  ˆ   
and adjust their beliefs accordingly. Now, the term  ˆ (; )
s    Q     
 ෶  denotes the density of an 
employer’s belief about the ability of a student at school a whose observed qualification is Q
s. 
The density function is truncated at  ˆ  . For students at school a, the truncation is at the lower end. 
For students at school b, the truncation is at the upper end. 
The maximization of a student at school a changes into: 
 
ˆ
ˆ max ( , ) ( ; ) ( ) ( )
ss
e      Q    Q    g d d C e 
    ෶  (5) Let  ˆ (, )
s
a BQ    
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If a policy maker maximizes the aggregate utility of all students the following result can be 
obtained.  
Proposition 1 A perfect selection is the dominant policy even if comprehensive education leads to 
higher observed qualifications.  
Students at school a in the sorting regime face a better peer group than they would in a 
comprehensive schools. Students at school b face a worse peer group. Given the 
complementarities in the production function the increase in qualification for students at school a 
is greater than the loss for students at school b. Students in comprehensive schools have to 
provide more effort to get the same qualification. This logic is applicable to a comparison 
between a perfect selection and any imperfect one. Appendix A provides a more specific proof of 
the proposition 
Proposition 1 holds even if comprehensive education leads to higher qualifications. In a 
comprehensive school signaling is a relatively strong motive for effort provision. In this school 
student effort influences the employers’ belief formation more strongly than in a selective one. 
This difference is particularly relevant for students with an average ability. With perfect selection 
students at school b with good observed qualifications will never be as able as students with a 
poor record at school a. Hence, comprehensive schools may elicit more effort and higher 
qualifications than schools in a selective system even though it is less productive.  Higher qualifications from higher effort levels may increase the wage offers for a student such 
that  ()() ()()
ns s
   kk B  f   d   B   f   d   
   holds. Yet, the additional costs of effort outweigh this 
increase in wage offers. Otherwise, equations (6) and (7) would be violated.  
Therefore higher qualifications are a result of an overinvestment. Comprehensive education can 
be the optimal solution, if qualification or effort provision generates positive external effects, e.g. 
happy parents.  
The properties of the peer effect also show which students prefer which educational system. 
Corollary 1 Students with  ˆ    
 prefer a selective schooling system, students with  ˆ     prefer a 
comprehensive one. Sorting increases the inequality in educational qualification between these 
two types of students.  
The expected marginal productivity is greater for high ability students ( ˆ    
 ) in the selective 
system and greater for low ability students ( ˆ     ) in the comprehensive system. The inequality 
in qualification increases in a selective system as good students gain from improved peer effects 
and low ability students lose accordingly. 
Students with a high expected qualification will leave a comprehensive school system, if they can 
also go to a selective one, e.g. a private school or a selective school in a neighboring jurisdiction. 
Of course, such an outside option undermines potential benefits from comprehensive schooling. 
 
 
4 Intertemporal incentives 
 
Almost all educational systems do not sort in elementary school but at some later point. In this 
section, the incentives from a selective school system for pre-selection students are analyzed. The 
results from the analysis have implications for econometric research which will be discussed in a 
subsection. Consider a two period process. In period t=1 (or in primary education) all students are educated in 
identical schools. In period t=2 (or secondary education) the students are either sorted or they are 
still kept in identical schools. In the selective case, sorting depends on the observed output in the 
first period (Q
1). This criterion allows for a cheap and simple selection mechanism. I assume that 
alternative selection instruments (tests, interviews etcs.) are prohibitively expensive. If Q
1 is 
greater than  ˆ q, the student will be sorted into better peer group. The term  ˆ q denotes the expected 
output of a student with median ability in equilibrium. Of course, this is an endogenous variable. 
Given an infinite number of students and effort provision increasing in ability this expected 
output constitutes a quasi-exogenous threshold value. 
Students can choose their respective effort level at the start of each period. The qualification in 
period 2 additionally depends on the actual qualification after period 1, such that  
  22 1 2 (,,;) ) k Qq e   q       (8) 
The separation into two periods changes the incentive structure of education as the majority of 
students in a tracking system have higher incentives in the first period. Selection generates 
incentives because higher effort increases the chance to be promoted to the good school with a 
better peer group. In particular, high ability students are motivated by the improved learning 
environment. For students with average ability, the gap between the two prospective peer groups 
induces them to work hard. On the other hand low ability students know that they are very likely 
to face a rather poor peer group and will provide rather low effort. Proposition 2 identifies the 
effort supply of students in period 1 depending on the educational policy and individual ability 
under ceteris paribus conditions. A comparison of effort supply functions in period 1 in the 
different regimes yields these results.  
Proposition 2 Assume that - for a given qualification q
1 from period 1 - the expected additional 
qualification in secondary education ((s,ns)) is identical in the sorting and in the non-sorting 
regime.  
  11 22
(, ) () () () () 0
sn s sn s
     s ns Q   Q   d  Q   Q   d      (9) 
Then, the following results hold:  1. First period qualification in the sorting regime is lower for the students with sufficiently 
low ability ( i.e.:  	 11 lim ( ) ( ) 0
sn s
  q  q 
  ) and higher for the median student and for 
students with very high ability. 	 11 ˆˆ ()()
s ns q    q    
  
2. Increasing uncertainty (increasing 
2) reduces the incentives for the students with median 
ability and increases the incentives for the students at the margins of the ability 
distribution.  
Proof. See Appendix B
Proposition 2 shows that selection increases the average student input even if selective secondary 
education does not imply a higher productivity. These increased differences in inputs lead to even 
greater inequalities in educational output at the end of the education. Result 2 is similar to results 
from bonus or tournament models. Increased uncertainty increases the likelihood of passing (or 
failing) for low (high) ability students. Hence, these students work harder to achieve the desired 




5 Econometric Implications 
 
The implication of proposition 2 is crucial for the empirical literature. The evaluation of tracking 
policies (e.g. Argys et al. 1996; Betts/Skolnick 2000; Figlio/Page 2002) often suffers from a lack 
of independent observations. It is also difficult because unmeasured factors can bias the 
estimation results, e.g. the impact of other policies or differences in teacher quality. The 
differences-in-differences approach by Hanushek and Woessmann (2006) controls for these 
institutional differences across countries, as long as tracking and non-tracking countries do not 
differ systematically in other relevant policies. The approach and the available data set of 
Hanushek and Woessmann do provide a valuable insight into the impact of tracking on the 
distribution of educational outcomes. Yet, their methodological improvement in one area raises another objection with respect to overall outcome. Hanushek and Woessmann (2006, p. 66) claim 
that  
 "[t]he impact of tracking can (...) be estimated by comparing the average achievement 
gain in tracked countries to that in untracked countries."  
Such a differences-in-differences methodology tests if equation (10) in proposition 2 is larger, 
smaller or equal to zero. However, due to result 1 in the previous proposition, (s,ns) does not 




   Q   d  Q   d  
  . Equation (10) just captures the impact of tracking on the obtained 
qualifications in secondary education. The full impact of tracking is underestimated. Note that 
recent empirical contributions have questioned the suitability of the approach and the robustness 





The paper has discussed a reason why positive effects from the selection of students are not 
observable, even if standard assumptions about peer group effects are not rejected. Sorting 
already provides a signal about unobservable ability. Hence, student performance in selective 
secondary education has less impact on the beliefs of an employer than in a comprehensive 
system. Introducing ability grouping transfers incentives from secondary into primary education. 
If the assumptions about peer effects are correct, then sorting is the dominant policy. Equality in 
test scores with identical financial inputs does not reflect unobservable effort provision. However, 
the case for further research on the properties of peer effects is obvious. 
The results allow deriving empirically testable hypotheses. Firstly, performance in primary 
education is higher in systems where selection takes place in secondary education. Primary 
education has a higher impact on labor market success in selective systems. Hence, differences-
in-differences estimations do not capture the full impact of tracking. Secondly, proposition 1 implies that comprehensive education requires higher effort contributions 
from students to acquire the same qualification. If this hypotheses can be confirmed it questions a 
popular assumption that improving qualification with given financial resources also improves 
welfare. This assumption only holds if the social benefits from education are sufficiently large. 
Beyond the empirical hypotheses the paper contributes to the understanding of educational testing 
and policy evaluation. The results seemingly imply that selection according to ability is an 
efficient educational policy. More precisely however, they state that the evidence is not as 
contrary to that statement as recent studies suggest. The results support the hypothesis that 
selection increases the inequality in educational outcome.  
Perhaps the most important contribution of the paper is towards the understanding of educational 
test results. Standardized international performance tests are a powerful tool to evaluate both 
schools and policies. For good reasons they are widely used in the social sciences and they 
become an increasingly popular evaluation tool for policy makers. However, the analysis in this 
paper has shown that an analysis of test scores should account for underlying incentives. It is the 
investigation of incentives which distinguishs economics from other social sciences. Hence, it is 
the topic where economists can provide the greatest impact for educational research. 
 
 
Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 1 
 
Proof. The marginal increase in observed qualification is greater if students are tracked according 
to their ability.  
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 Students at school a in the sorting regime face a better peer group than they would in a 
comprehensive schools. Students at school b face a worse peer group. Ability is symmetrically 
distributed around  ˆ  , such that average ability in both schools is equidistant from the average 











, see assumption 2). Hence, the increase in qualification for 
students at school a is greater than the loss for students at school b. Students in comprehensive 
schools have to provide more effort to get the same qualification. The logic is applicable to a 
comparison between a perfect selection and any imperfect one.   
 
Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 2 
 
The analysis of intertemporal incentives is backwards. Period 2 is analogous to what has been 
discussed in the previous section, with two notable exceptions. Firstly, the peer group effects are 
different because sorting is based on the observable output Q
1. which depends on a random 
variable. Hence, some less able or less engaged students will slip into the better peer group and 
vice versa. This exception does not imply changes in the qualitative results of the previous 
section. Secondly, the impact of the output in period 1 has to be taken into account. Therefore, 
further qualitative differences between a selective and comprehensive system stem from 
differences in the pre-selection period. 
In this period 1, consider first the non-sorting case. The problem of a student is the following: 
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 (12) The school indicator k has been ignored in the notation because all schools are identical in both 
periods. In the comprehensive school system students in elementary school are only motivated by 
the effect on their post-educational wages. 
For the sorting case, a student has to solve  
  	  	  	
1 12 1 1 1 2 1 1 , 1 ˆˆ ˆ ˆ max Pr ( ( ) ) 1 Pr ( ( ) ) ( )
ss
e i Qq B Q qQq Qq B Q qQqC e 
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Notation in the equation is simplified, with  
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Recall that g(.) is the density function of the random variable. The term   	 1 ˆ gQ q  B   in equation 
(14) denotes the increase in probability to get the higher returns from better schooling. Due to the 
properties of the error term, the following conditions hold for students with very high expected 
output and for students with very low expected output:   	  	 11 ˆˆ lim lim 0
qq gQ q gQ q
     (15) 




  (16) 
Very able students are almost certain to go to school a. Students with very low ability are bound 
for school b. Additional effort basically does not affect the selection outcome. 
The peer group effects imply that very good students benefit from increased marginal productivity 
in a selective system, while low ability students face a loss in productivity (see proof of 
proposition 1):  
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These implications establish the results for the high ability students and the low ability students. 
For the student with  ˆ     ,  
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has to hold in order to satisfy the proposition. Since both schools have the same amount of 
students, the expected qualification in period 1 for a student is defined by the threshold value  ˆ q 
such that  	 1 ˆ () ( 0 )0 gE Q q g  
 . The peer effects imply  
  	 	 	
21 1 21 1 2
11
11 1
ˆˆ (( ) ) (( ) ) () ˆˆ Pr 1 Pr











which establishes equation (17). For result 2 notice that  	 1 ˆ gQ q   increases with increasing uncertainty at the margins of the 
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